Recently, local official's promotion incentive has a significant link with economic performance. With the selection and promotion of officials' mechanism, they may have a positive effect on local economic development. This paper will choose the data of 283 secretaries of municipal Party committee and mayors and observe the impact of local officials' turnover by controlling other variables and DID. And we find that it will have a significant impact on local economic performance. In the meantime, the heterogeneity of officials and frequency of turnover can interpret this mechanism, and this paper may give a positive consideration to the regional economic growth and has a certain significant guiding aiming at assessment of officials' promotion and political selection.
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the Chinese reform and opening up, China's economic structure has important changes and transitions with the rapid and sustained development. Along with the change of economic situation and development model, at the same time, China's political system and the official selection mechanism have changed to a large extent. In the last three decades of reform and opening up, turnover of China's mayors and municipal party committee secretaries becomes normal in China's political system. From 2002 to 2006, the turnover of the mayor of cities accounted for 61.3%; the turnover of the two mayors of cities accounted for 25.3%; no turnover of the mayor of cities accounted for only about 13.3% of the total. Whether the turnover of officials will significantly affect the local economic development? This issue is worth being focused by many scholars.
Liu Ruiming (2007) finds that the promotion of officials and economic incentives will produce cyclical fluctuations for China's economy. The research of Chen Y. et al. (2005) shows that promotion from the central to local officials brings the political gains, and it can significantly change the governance structure of local officials, which mainly reflected in the promotion of local economic development.
At the same time, Officials' political life cycle leading to the periodical changes of economy is largely due to the heterogeneity of officials' economic governance in their areas (Wang Xianbin and Xu Xianxiang, 2008) . Because of this heterogeneity, before and after the turnover of officials, different officials will play different roles in the same area's economic development. Numerous studies show that the evidence from official turnover can explain the phenomenon of the economic fluctuations. Because of competitive tournament for the promotion mechanism of local officials, developing local economy and improving the economic growth become the first choice for officials. ( Therefore, the official's turnover will affect the local economic growth, and how can we understand this influence mechanism? Scholars suggested that, from the perspective of GDP expenditure method, investment and consumption are the most important mode to increase local economic growth. Meanwhile, some scholars believe that the official's investment impulse will result in the local economic fluctuate, which also can explain the behaviors of local economic growth and prompt the irrational increase of local GDP (Zhou Lian, 2004; Luo Danglun, 2015) . At the same time, there are also some scholars from the enterprise point of view to understand the official selection and turnover for the impact of local business development. Allen, F. et al. (2005) find that government intervention and the local market will affect the enterprise's debt structure, and government relations will be regarded as an important judicial guarantee of alternative mechanism to intervene enterprise's development.
In view of the above literatures and analysis, this paper from the perspective of municipal party committee secretaries and mayors of turnover, using DID and the data of 283 prefecture-level cities from 2005 to 2007 to analyze the impact of official's turnover on local economic development. The official's turnover of the prefecture-level city is a political fluctuation and it also is the national official turnover policy implementation. So it can be seen as a quasi natural experiment. This paper will focus on the impact of this "policy experiment", in order to inspect the effect of official's turnover. We control a series of confound variables such as employment, foreign direct investment, the budget for the financial expenditure, total savings of urban and rural residents, the local industrialization level and industrial structure and we find that prefecture-level city official turnover has a significantly positive effect on economic growth and it shows that regional political fluctuation can promote regional economic development. Eventually, by changing the time of policy for the robustness of the counterfactual test, we test this method passing the common trend assumptions.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The official's turnover of the prefecture-level city is a political fluctuation and it is also a national official turnover policy implementation. So it can be seen as a quasi natural experiment. We divide the 283 prefecture-level cities in China from 2000 to 2010 into four groups in accordance with whether they accept intervention, they are the treatment group before the official's turnover , the treatment group after the official's turnover, the control group before the official's turnover and the control group after the official's turnover. In order to more clearly describe the group division, we set intervention dummy variable R and time dummy variable T for details. R=1 represents the prefecture-level city where the officials replaced, R=0 indicates the prefecture-level cities where officials did not replace; T=1 means the year after the turnover of the prefecture-level city officials , T=0 means the year before the turnover of the prefecture-level city officials. With the division of the group, DID econometric model can be set as follows:
(1) In this model, the subscripts i and t denote the i-th prefecture-level city and the t-th year respectively, R represents the dummy variable of the city where the official replace, T represents the dummy variable in which the official replace, Z represents a series of control variables, and ε represents the random disturbance. And Y represents the explained variable, and it means the per capita GDP of prefecture-level cities' economic growth . 
DATA SOURCES, VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This paper uses panel data for 2000-2010 to assess the impact of city officials' turnover on economic growth. Therefore, most of the variables used in this article are all from annual "The Urban Statistical Yearbook Of China" and are calculated on the basis of original data, such as the municipal per capita GDP, labor employment, foreign direct investment, budgeted fiscal expenditure, industrialization, industrial structure, level of human capital and total saving rate. And the core of explanatory variables is officials' turnover, and it refers to the turnover of party secretary of prefecture-level city. This data from the People's Republic of prefectural municipal party committee secretary database (2000-2010).The specific selection variables and the calculation method are presented in table 2. table, we can see that the turnover of officials in different years has a positive effect on economic growth. It indicates that regional political fluctuation can promote regional economic development. In addition, from the perspective of control variables, the area of labor employment level and foreign of directly investment on economic growth of significantly promote role, this conclusion verifies classical economic growth theory; In the course of regional economic development, industrialization level and industry structure of development promote the economic growth. Meanwhile, the level of education used to reflect the status of human capital in the region continues to promote economic growth, but the high rate of national saving has an impeditive effect on regional economic growth. 
EMPIRICAL RESULT AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK Empirical Results

Prefecture
Robustness Check
In the DID method, the most important assumption is that the treatment groups and control groups must meet common trends. Counterfactual tests were conducted by changing the timing of the policy, and the common trend hypothesis was tested. We will change officials' turnover time 3 years ahead, if the coefficients of the TxR is not significantly positive, it indicates that turnover of the prefecture-level city official has made an important contribution to regional economic growth. And if the coefficients of the TxR is significantly positive, then we can draw a conclusion that economic growth could come from other policy factors or random factors, rather than turnover from city officials. By constructing a counterfactual test, it shows that the assumption that the common trend needed to satisfy the double-difference model is satisfied and proves that the difference-in-difference model estimation results in table 4 are credible. Meanwhile, it also shows that the prefecture-level city official turnover has a significant role in promoting regional economic growth, and this conclusion has very valid stability.
CONCLUSIONS
China's rapid economic development in the end by what factors to promote, there are still controversial, but the long-term effect of officials' own promotion incentives on the local economy can explain this problem to a large extent. Economic shocks not only come from economic considerations, but also come from policy uncertainties and political fluctuations that can have a profound impact on a given range. Therefore, in view of this problem, this paper gives an effective identification and analysis of the effects of the political fluctuation of officials' turnover on local economic growth. By using the difference-in-difference method to eliminate endogenous, we can found that this mechanism has a positive lasting effect to some extent. The fluctuation difference between the self-heterogeneity and turnover frequency of the officials can explain the influence on the local economic development, and it has a certain guiding significance for the officials' assessment and the political selection and the regional economic growth.
